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The FTC's Competition Policy after the Intel Settlement
Justin Whitesides*

INTRODUCTION

Judge Posner said the following about Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (Section 5): "It used to be thought that 'unfair
methods of competition' swept further than practices forbidden by the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, and you find this point repeated occasionally even today, but it is no longer tenable."1 The FTC disagrees. According to Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, "[A]s a matter of law,
Section 5 is broader in scope and deeper in reach than Section 2 of the
Sherman Act."'2 Chairman Joe Leibowitz has echoed Commissioner
Rosch's expansive reading of Section 5,3 and recent FTC actions indicate that the agency is using the provision to expand its ability to chal4
lenge "anticompetitive" conduct.
In August 2010, Intel settled an FTC complaint based solely on Section 5 of the FTC Act.5 The FTC alleged that Intel had "engaged in a
course of conduct that, considered individually or collectively, violate[d]" Section 5.6 The FTC contended that Intel's behavior
* J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, May 2012; B.A. cum laude, English
Literature, Arizona State University, May 2002.
1. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
761, 766 (2005). Judge Posner does not think all FTC actions are misguided; he praises its "genuine accomplishments" in FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp 1066 (D.D.C. 1997), and the first Intel
consent decree, among others, in the same article. Id. at 765.
2. J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Welcoming Remarks, FTC Section 5
Workshop 1 (Oct. 17, 2008), www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/section5/docs/trosch.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, "Tales from the Crypt" Episodes '08
and '09: The Return of Section 5 ("Unfair Methods of Competition in Commerce Hereby Declared Unlawful"), Section 5 Workshop 5 (Oct. 17, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/
081017section5.pdf ("[E]veryone can agree (I've decided) that the FTC Act goes beyond the
metes and bounds of the Sherman Act."); Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, 5
(Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/090924fordhamspeech.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Negotiated Data Solutions, L.L.C., FTC Docket No. C-4234 (Sept. 23, 2008) (Decision and Order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080923ndsdo.pdf; Intel Corp., FTC
Docket No. 9341 (Oct. 29, 2010) (Decision and Order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/101
102inteldo.pdf.
5. See Intel Corp., FTC Docket No. 9341 (July 28, 2010) (Agreement Containing Consent
Order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/100804intelagree.pdf [hereinafter Intel Agreement].
6. Intel Corp., FTC Docket No. 9341 at 1 (Dec. 16, 2009) (Complaint), http://www.ftc.gov/os/
adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf [hereinafter Intel Complaint].
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amounted to "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices. ' '7 The details of Intel's alleged course of conduct and the legal implications of the rule the FTC used are the
subject of this paper.
Briefly stated, the FTC accused Intel of four violations of Section
5.8 First was the chipmaker's exclusive dealing arrangements with
computer manufacturers. 9 Second was that the company designed
software to slow the performance of rival central processing units
(CPUs). 1° Third was its conduct regarding rival graphics processing
units (GPUs): it denied interoperability between rival GPUs and Intel
CPUs, and also, it bundled Intel CPUs and GPUs as part of a predatory pricing scheme." Fourth, the company allegedly delayed access
2
to some of the industry standards it controls.'
This Article examines the implications of the FTC's use of Section 5
in the Intel settlement, providing businesses wary of future FTC interventions with a guide to the types of conduct likely to draw its attention. In exploring the uncertain nature of Section 5, the paper seeks
to articulate a framework within which to contain the provision. Part
I briefly lays out Section 5's relationship with the Sherman Act and
recounts the historical enforcement of the former provision from its
inception up to the 2010 Intel settlement. Part II details Intel's conduct through the lens of the objections levied against it by the FTC.
Part III articulates the stated and implied rules the Commission applied. Part IV analyzes the rule and proposes a legal standard that can
confine Section 5 enforcement. A brief conclusion follows in Part V.

I.

BACKGROUND

Section 5 of the FTC Act provides: "Unfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful. ' 13 Commentators agree that the 1914 Congress enacted Section 5 to reach more
7. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006); see also Intel Complaint, supra note 6, at 17-18.
8. Intel does not stipulate that these facts are true: "This Consent Agreement is for settlement
purposes only and does not constitute an admission by [Intel] that the law has been violated as
alleged in the Complaint, or that the facts as alleged in the Complaint, other than jurisdictional
facts, are true." Intel Agreement, supra note 5,
6.
9. Intel Corp., Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, 75 Fed. Reg.
48,338, 48,340 to 41 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Aug. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Intel Analysis].
10. Id. at 48,341.
11. Id. at 48,341 to 42.
12. Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 92.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
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conduct than the Sherman Act does. 14 However, Supreme Court decisions beginning in the 1940s and ending in the late 1970s enlarged
the Sherman Act's reach, which effectively engulfed Section 5.15
Thus, the FTC usually tries antitrust cases under Section 5 using Sher16
man Act theories.
But since the late 1970s, the Supreme Court has tightened the standards of Sherman Act violations. 17 Procedurally, Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 8 and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly 19 significantly limited the ability of private plaintiffs to get
to trial. 20 Other decisions, such as Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp.2 1 and Verizon Communications, Inc. v.
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,22 have limited the Sherman Act's
reach with respect to single-firm conduct. Brooke Group set a test
that "unquestionably tilts the balance toward the defendant in predatory pricing suits." '23 Trinko placed the Supreme Court's imprimatur
on monopoly power because it "attracts 'business acumen' in the first
place [and] it induces risk taking that produces innovation and eco'24
nomic growth.
With the Sherman Act thus restricted, Section 5 has become more
attractive to the FTC as it seeks to challenge conduct that is increasingly out of reach. The history of Section 5 is relatively brief and provides important limits to its power. FTC v. Motion PictureAdvertising
Service Co. states, "The 'unfair methods of competition[,'] which are
condemned by § 5(a) of the Act, are not confined to those that were
14. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 1, at 767; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 FLA. L. REV. 871, 873 (2010); William Kovacic & Marc Winerman,
Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 930-33 (2010).

15. See Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 14, at 934-35.
16. See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 694-695 (1948).
17. See Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 14, at 937.
18. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) ("[I]f
the
claim is one that simply makes no economic sense-respondents must come forward with more
persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary.").
19. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (raising pleading standards from "no
set of facts" test of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) to a new "plausible on its face"
standard).
20. See D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1055, 1065-66 (2010).
21. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
22. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
23. Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error,52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 121 (2010).
Brooke Group requires plaintiffs to prove (1) pricing below an appropriate measure of its rival's
costs, and (2) a dangerous probability that the rival will be able to recoup its investment in
below-cost prices. 509 U.S. at 222-23.
24. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407 (quoting U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
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illegal at common law or that were condemned by the Sherman
Act. ' 25 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. states that the Commission
has the power under Section 5 to "define and proscribe an unfair competitive practice, even though the practice does not infringe either the
'2 6
letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws."
Since Sperry & Hutchinson, courts have not defined "unfair methods of competition" except by rejecting the FTC's theories when it
attempts to reach farther than the Sherman Act allows. 27 Thus, the
only certainties under Section 5 are what it does not reach. These
answers can be found in Boise Cascade v. FTC, Official Airline Guides
v. FTC, E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC (Ethyl), and FTC v.
28
Abbott Laboratories.
In Boise Cascade (1980), the Ninth Circuit addressed the FFC's contention that oligopolists' parallel pricing, "although not yet having grown into Sherman Act dimensions[,] would[ ]
mostly likely do so if left unrestrained. '29 Boise Cascade rejected the
FTC's argument and held that "a mere showing of parallel action will
'30
not establish a section 5 violation.
In Official Airlines Guides (1980), the Second Circuit addressed the
FTC's claim that it should have the power to stop a monopolist that
refuses to deal with others in a way that arbitrarily harms competition
in a second market. 3 1 In rejecting this theory, the court reasoned that
"enforcement of the FTC's order here would give the FTC too much
power to substitute its own business judgment for that of the monopolist in any decision that arguably affects competition in another
32
industry."
In Ethyl (1984), the Second Circuit addressed the FFC's argument
that it could stop oligopolists from "facilitating" parallel price increases. 33 The three facilitating practices were advance notice of price
increases, most favored nation clauses "under which the seller promised that no customer would be charged a higher price than other customers[,]" and uniform delivered price that included all costs up to
delivery. 34 The court disagreed with the FTC: "As the Commission
25. FTC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953).
26. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972).
27. Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 14, at 942.
28. Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 581-82 (9th Cir. 1980); Official Airline Guides,
Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. (Ethyl) v. FTC, 729
F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984); FTC v. Abbott Labs., 853 F. Supp. 526 (D.D.C. 1994).
29. Boise Cascade,637 F.2d at 581 (quoting FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 708 (1948)).
30. Id. at 577.
31. Official Airlines Guides, 630 F.2d at 926.
32. Id. at 927.
33. See Ethyl, 729 F.2d at 130.
34. Id. at 130.
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moves away from attacking conduct that is either a violation of the
antitrust laws or collusive, coercive, predatory, restrictive or deceitful,
and seeks to break new ground by enjoining otherwise legitimate
practices, the closer must be our scrutiny upon judicial review. '' 35 The
Second Circuit then formulated its constraints for Section 5 enforcement in an oligopolistic industry: "[A] minimum standard demands
that, absent a tacit agreement, at least some indicia of oppressiveness
must exist such as (1) evidence of anticompetitive intent or purpose
...or (2) the absence of an independent legitimate business reason
'36
for its conduct.
In Abbott (1994), the District of Columbia Circuit applied Ethyl's
Section 5 test to an FTC action against a pharmaceutical company's
noncompetitive bid. 37 The Ethyl standard itself did not fail; instead,
the conduct failed the test: the pharmaceutical company did not manifest anticompetitive intent and had a legitimate business justification
for its noncompetitive bid.3 8 The bid was its optimal competitive
strategy given the surrounding circumstances. 39 Thus, the Abbott
40
court held for the pharmaceutical company.
Abbott is the last appellate review of the FTC's Section 5 authority
to stop conduct that is not quite a Sherman Act violation. 41 Therefore, on appellate review, at least in the D.C. and Second Circuits, the
Ethyl standard will apply when a firm challenges the FTC's Section 5
authority to condemn oligopolistic conduct that does not violate the
Sherman Act.
But this does not settle the question of Section 5's limits. Indeed,
the FTC itself is searching for a workable standard as it seeks to increase intervention. In October of 2008, the FTC held a workshop to
"examine three topics: (1) the history of Section 5... ; (2) the range of
possible interpretations of Section 5; and (3) examples of business
conduct that may be unfair methods of competition addressable by
Section 5. ' ' 42 Additionally, the FTC has recently used Section 5 to
stop "anticompetitive" conduct that was arguably legal under the
35. Id. at 137.
36. Id. at 139.
37. FTC v. Abbott Labs., 853 F. Supp. 526, 533 (D.D.C. 1994).
38. Id. at 535-37.
39. Id. at 534-35.
40. Id. at 536-37.
41. See Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 14, at 941-42.
42. Public Workshop Concerning the Prohibition of Unfair Methods of Competition in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 50,818, 50,819 (Fed. Trade Comm'n
Aug. 28, 2008). Comprehensive information on the workshop is available at http://www.ftc.gov/
bc/workshops/section5/index.shtml.
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Sherman Act. Those two settlements were with Negotiated Data So44
lutions (N-Data) in 200843 and Intel in 2010.

Intel's conduct was summarized above and will be discussed at
length in the following materials. N-Data's behavior involved licens-

ing agreements for patents relating to an industry standard for
Ethernet connections. 45 In a series of assignments, N-Data obtained
patent rights to technology that had won an industry standard for Fast
Ethernet connections. 4 6 The company that developed the technology,
National, competed with others to win the industry standard. 4 7 In this

competition, National promised the industry that "if [its] technology
were chosen, National would license [its technology] to any requesting
party for a one-time fee of $1,000." ' 48 Years later, when N-Data obtained rights to the patent, it refused to honor the $1,000 license fee to
new companies and it threatened legal actions against companies re-9
fusing to pay N-Data royalties "far in excess" of the original price.4
The FTC challenged the above conduct as (1) an unfair method of
competition and (2) an unfair act or practice. 50 Within the first prong,
the FTC used two limiting principles. 51 First, it used the Ethyl test to
analyze the "nature of the conduct. ' 52 The FTC found that N-Data's
"patent hold-up [was] inherently 'coercive' and 'oppressive' with respect to firms that are.., locked into a standard.

' 53

Second, the FTC

found that the conduct had an adverse impact on competition. 54 The
adverse impact it found was that N-Data raised prices and undermined the standard-setting process. 55 Because the standard-setting
43. See Negotiated Data Solutions L.L.C., FTC Docket No. C-4234 (Sept. 22, 2008) (Decision
and Order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080923ndsdo.pdf.
44. See Intel Agreement, supra note 5.
45. See Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public
Comment, 73 Fed. Reg. 5846-01, 5847 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Jan. 30, 2008) [hereinafter N-Data
Analysis]. N-Data does not stipulate that these facts are true: "The Agreement has been entered
into for settlement purposes only, and does not constitute an admission by N-Data that the law
has been violated as alleged or that the facts alleged, other than jurisdictional facts, are true."
Id.
46. See id. at 5847-48.
47. See id. at 5847.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See N-Data Analysis, supra note 45, at 5847.
51. See id. at 5849.
52. Id.
53. See id. (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. (Ethyl) v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139-40 (2d
Cir. 1984)).
54. See id.
55. See N-Data Analysis, supra note 45, at 5849.
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process is procompetitive, the FTC reasoned, N-Data's conduct un56
dermining it was anticompetitive.

The second prong of the FTC's Section 5 theory, unfair acts or practices, is limited by statute: "The Commission shall have no authority
...unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. '57 The FTC found injury to consumers in "increased prices due to the higher royalties. ' 58 It found that consumers
could not have avoided the price increases because "the industry

could not have reasonably anticipated [it] before the market wide
adoption of the standard and ...consumers had no chance of avoiding
[it] due to network effects and lock-in. '59 Finally, instead of analyzing
any possible procompetitive justifications, the FTC stated simply that
N-Data's price increases "have no apparent 'countervailing benefit'to those upon whom demands have been made, ultimate consumers,
or to competition-so the [third] requirement is also met. ' 60 The
FTC's treatment of this case has been praised and criticized, 61 and as
William Kovacic noted, "N-Data is interesting, but the concept applied there becomes truly significant only if and when it ultimately

prevails in a contested matter and survives review in the appellate
process."

62

To summarize the state of Section 5 enforcement leading up to the
Intel settlement, one can be reasonably certain of five things. First,
Boise Cascade suggests that a court will not likely find for the FTC if it

challenges an oligopolistic parallel price increase when no other indi-

56. See id.
57. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)).
58. Id.at 5850.
59. Id.
60. N-Data Analysis, supra note 45. (quoting Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354,
1364 (11th Cir. 1988)).
61. For praise, see Robert H. Lande, Revitalizing Section 5 of the FTC Act Using "Consumer
Choice" Analysis, 8-FEB ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 4 (2009) ("The FTC's action in the ...N-Data[]
case should be applauded, and the Commission commended for condemning the opportunistic
behavior at issue and affirming that conduct can be an antitrust violation of the FTC Act even if
it does not violate the Sherman Act."). For criticism, see Jonathan Gleklen, The Emerging Antitrust Philosophy of FTC Commissioner Rosch, 23 ANTITRUST 46, 49 (2009) ("How was N-Data's
conduct any more "oppressive" or "coercive" than any other breach of contract by a firm? ...
And while it is helpful to know that Commissioner Rosch believes that there must be an adverse
effect on competition, it is far from clear where he believes that such an effect could be found in
the Negotiated Data case.").
62. Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 14, at 941.
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cation of collusion exists. 63 Second, Official Airlines Guides shows
that a court will not likely find for the FTC if it challenges a monopolist's refusal to deal with another firm, even if there is harm to a second market. 64 Third, Ethyl teaches that a court will not likely find for
the FTC if it challenges an oligopolist's facilitating practices that
might signal parallel price increases. 65 Fourth, Abbott shows that
Ethyl provides a workable standard of review for appellate courts.
That standard is that the FTC must show "some indicia of oppressiveness ... such as (1) evidence of anticompetitive intent or purpose...
or (2) the absence of an independent legitimate business reason for its
conduct. ' 66 Finally, N-Data shows that the FTC is likely to use its
Section 5 authority to challenge practices that harm the standard-set67
ting process.
The 2010 Intel settlement, however, does not provide so many an68
swers. The FTC's complaint follows a "course of conduct" theory
that was sufficiently unbounded to have led Commissioner Rosch to
concur and dissent from the complaint. 69 Chairman Leibowitz, on the
other hand, announced, "Everyone, including Intel, gets a greater degree of certainty about the rules of the road going forward, which allows all the companies in this dynamic industry to move ahead and
build better, more innovative products." 70 But since the legal rules
encompassing this conduct are not clear, one must look to the conduct
itself to find the "certainty" Chairman Leibowitz promotes. Clearly
articulating such conduct from the point of view of the FTC is one
goal of this Article. The second is to articulate a working framework
within which to contain the provision.
Finally, before beginning an analysis of the 2010 Intel settlement, it
is helpful to review how this case fits into the context of the past and
pending antitrust actions against Intel. In May 2009, the European
63. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 581 (9th Cir. 1980); see also supra notes
29-30 and accompanying text.
64. See Official Airlines Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920, 927 (2d Cir. 1980); see also supra
notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
65. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. (Ethyl) v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 128 (2d Cir. 1984); see
also supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
66. Id. at 139.
67. See N-Data Analysis, supra note 45, at 5847-50; see also supra notes 45-62 and accompanying text.
68. Intel Complaint, supra note 6, at 1-2.
69. Intel Corp., FTC Docket No. 9341 (Dec. 16, 2009) (Concurring and Dissenting Statement
of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelstatement.
pdf.
70. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Press Release, FTC Settles Charges of Anticompetitive Conduct Against Intel (Aug, 4, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/08/intel.shtm.
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Commission levied a $1.45 billion fine against Intel for its discount,
rebate, and loyalty practices. 71 Intel appealed to the Court of First
Instance in July 2009.72 Then, on November 3, 2009, New York's Attorney General filed an antitrust suit against Intel, challenging its rebate, discount, and loyalty practices. 73 Finally, on November 11, 2009,

Intel paid AMD (the rival chipmaker) $1.25 billion to settle all their
antitrust and patent disputes. 74 Notable in the extensive settlement
agreement with AMD is that Intel agreed not to provide benefits to

manufacturers in exchange for their exclusive use of Intel proces-

sors. 75 Therefore, by the time the FTC filed its action in December
2009, Intel was already required to pay up to $2.7 billion and had already agreed with AMD to stop offering conditional benefits to manufacturers that exclusively deal with Intel.

II.

INTEL'S MARKET STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, AND
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT

The following Part details Intel's conduct through the lens of the
FTC's complaint. It appears that over the course of the investigation,
some of the claims were dropped, as a few of them do not appear in
the Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public
Comment. 76 Nevertheless, this Article will lay out each claim initially
charged, because one purpose of the Article is to provide concrete
examples of the types of conduct that catch the FTC's attention. Part
A below details the FTC's perception of Intel's market structure, Part
B examines the alleged conduct, and Part C identifies the supposed
anticompetitive effects.
71. See Summary of Commission Decision of 13 May 2009 relating to a proceeding under
Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/C-3/37.990 Intel), 2009 O.J. (C 227) 13, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=OJ:C:2009:227:0013:0017:EN:PDF; see also Punishing Intel, ECONOMIST (May 13, 2009),
http://www.economist.com/node/13641492.
72. Case T-286/09, Intel v Comm'n 2009 O.J. (C 220) 41 (2009), available at http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:220:0041:0042:EN:PDF.
73. See Complaint, N.Y. v. Intel Corp., No. 09-00827, 2009 WL 3697889 (D. Del. Nov. 4,
2009).
74. Intel and AMD Settlement Agreement, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp.,
No. 05-441, (D. Del. Nov. 11, 2009), http://download.intel.com/pressroom/legal/amd/AMDsettlement.agreement.pdf [hereinafter Intel and AMD Settlement]; see also Agreeing on a Payoff, ECONOMIST (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/14885938.
75. Intel and AMD Settlement, supra note 74, § 2.1.1.
76. Compare Intel Analysis, supra note 9, at 48,342 with Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 92
(indicating that the FTC's Analysis of Agreement does not include the final portion of the complaint regarding Intel's alleged misrepresentations relating to industry standards for USB and
HDCP connections).
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Intel's Market Structure

77
One product market is for x86 central processing units (CPUs).
CPUs are "the brains" of computers, essential to almost every func78
tion of a computer because they process data and control devices.
Three companies make x86 CPUs capable of running Microsoft or
Apple Operating Systems: Intel, AMD, and Via. 79 The FTC asserts
that no other type of microprocessor is an adequate substitute to an
x86 CPU-neither the "ARM" processors of hand-held devices nor
the "Power" or "Sparc" processors used in high-end servers.8 0
The FTC states that Intel has a monopoly in the x86 CPU market
because it has a "unit share" higher than seventy-five percent and its
revenue share exceeds eighty percent. 81 The FTC also explains several entry barriers. First is product development, which "takes years
of engineering work and several hundred million dollars in sunk capital."'8 2 Second is the "cost and expertise to develop manufacturing
capabilities," which is "at least $3 billion" and "another $1 billion in
each facility every two or three years. '83 Third is the patents that apply to x86 CPUs. 4 Fourth is the "establishment of product reputation
and compatibility," which is a "multi-year project. ' 85 Finally, the FTC
alleged that "Intel's unfair methods of competition and efforts to
maintain or obtain a monopoly position in the markets" create an ad86
ditional entry barrier to the x86 CPU market.

77. Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 29.
78. Id. [33.
79. Id. .135.
80. Id. 91
36.
81. Id. 41.
82. Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 1 42-43.
83. Id. J 42, 44.
84. Id. 1[ 42, 45.
85. Id. 11 42, 46.
86. Id. 1 42. An analysis of market power alone could consume the remainder of this paper.
For example, the F[C claimed that ARM technology is not a substitute. This could be challenged. ARM chips are in most netbooks, tablet PCs, and other mobile computing devices that
even in 2009 were rapidly consuming market share as substitutes for PCs. See generally Ashlee
Vance & Matt Richtel, Light and Cheap, Netbooks Are Poised to Reshape PC Industry, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2009), at B2, available at http:l/www.nytimes.com/2009/04102/technology/O2net
books.html?_r=l#. Additionally, the FTC's alleged entry barriers include research and development costs along with reputational development that Intel and any other competitor has faced
and would have to face. Inquiry into "whether costs borne by all market participants should be
considered entry barriers is the subject of much debate." United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting the divergence of opinion sparked by comparing JOE S.
BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING

INDUSTRIES

67-70 (1968)).

6-7 (1956) with

GEORGE STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY
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Another product market is for graphics processing units (GPUs),
which originally only processed graphics, but are evolving to process
many of the computations originally reserved for a CPU.87 GPUs can
be integrated onto the CPU die or they can be included as a separate
card in the computer system. 88 Intel, AMD (through its affiliate,
ATI), Via, and Nvidia manufacture GPUs. 89 The FTC alleges that
GPUs are becoming a significant threat to the dominant position of
high-end x86 CPUs. 90 When a GPU performs more computations, it
relieves the burden on the CPU, making it possible for computer manufacturers to use less expensive CPUs than they did before. 91
Intel holds fifty percent of the GPU market because of its integrated chipsets, which include an Intel CPU and GPU. 92 Nvidia and
ATI split the rest of the market. 93 The FTC describes entry barriers to
this market simply as "high. '94 But it goes on to point out that GPUs
are complimentary to CPUs, and therefore open connections between
the CPU, GPU, and other chipsets must be interoperable. 95 Because
Intel controls most of the CPU market, it "dictates the interoper96
ability" of these connections.
B.

Intel's Conduct

The complaint divides Intel's conduct into four categories, which
this Article will mirror organizationally to provide a clear picture of
how the FTC views certain arrangements. First is the chipmaker's exclusive agreements with computer manufacturers. 97 Second is its deceptive software design. 98 Third is its conduct in the GPU market,
which includes tampering with interoperability, deceptive software design, and bundling to accomplish predatory pricing. Fourth is Intel's
misrepresentations in the standard-setting process. 99
87. Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 38.
88. Id. 39.
89. Id. IT 16-17.
90. Id. $1 17-18.
91. Id.
92. Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 1$ 37, 75.
93. Id. T 75.
94. Id. T 76.
95. Id. 1 80.
96. Id.
97. Intel Complaint, supra note 6, I9 49-55.
98. Id. 11 56-71.
99. Id. 11 75-91. Note this allegation seems to have been dropped because it does not appear
in the Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment. See supra note 76 and
accompanying text (comparing the Intel Analysis with the Intel Complaint).
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1. Intel's Exclusivity Agreements with Computer Manufacturers
The FTC alleged that Intel forced or attempted to force the largest
computer makers, called Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs),
to use only Intel CPUs. 100 These OEMs are Hewlett-Packard/Compaq, Dell, IBM, Lenovo, Toshiba, Acer/Gateway, Sun, Sony, NEC,
Apple, and Fujitsu. 10 Together they account for sixty percent of computers with CPUs. 102 Because of Intel's dominant share of the CPU
market, it is a necessary supplier to every OEM, and therefore each
OEM could not shift "all or even a majority of their CPU purchases
10 3
away from Intel.'
The first tactic Intel allegedly used was to keep OEMs from advertising and distributing non-Intel computers. 10 4 It accomplished this by
threatening to withhold rebates, technical support, or supply; it also
threatened to terminate joint development projects. 10 5 The
chipmaker also "presented scorecards to the OEMs, evaluating their
10 6
compliance" with Intel's exclusivity requirements.
Intel's second strategy was to offer market share and volume
discounts.' 0 7 The FTC essentially claims that these discounts were
predatory. When Intel offered a market share discount or volume discount, it allegedly priced its CPUs below cost.108 The cost definition is
"average variable cost plus an appropriate level of contribution towards sunk costs." 10 9 Because the FTC had already concluded that
Intel was a monopolist, it claimed that it was likely to recoup any
losses incurred by pricing below cost." 0
A third strategy was price discrimination for OEMs based on
whether they purchased "certain volumes of CPUs from Intel's competitors.""' Because of Intel's unmatched scale in supplying CPUs,
100. Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 49.
101. Id.
102. Id. 49.
103. Id. 9150.
104. Id. 9152.
105. Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 9152.
106. Id.
107. Id. T 53.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 9153. Interestingly, the FrC asserted that a Section 5
claim does not require that the predatory pricing firm be capable of recouping its losses, which is
a departure from the Supreme Court's standard, briefly stated as follows: "The second prerequisite to holding a competitor liable under the antitrust laws for charging low prices is a demonstration that the competitor had a reasonable prospect, or, under § 2 of the Sherman Act, a
dangerous probability, of recouping its investment in below-cost prices." Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993).
111. Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 9153.
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some of its chips allegedly do not face any competition; these "uncontested" chips are the OEMs' only choice. 112 These are distinguished
from "contested" CPUs, which do face competition. 1 3 Intel allegedly
offered an incentive for OEMs who purchased only a low volume of
CPUs from its competitors: prices on the contested CPUs and uncontested CPUs were lower than the prices OEMs would get if they purchased a high volume of competitors' chips. 1 4 By contrast, Intel
punished OEMs that purchased a high volume of its competitors'
CPUs: prices on contested and uncontested CPUs were higher than
the prices they would have received if they purchased a low volume of
15
competitors' chips."
The fourth strategy, which the FTC claims was "to discipline and
punish OEMs that chose to deal with Intel's competitors," was to offer rewards to OEMs that exclusively (or nearly exclusively) purchased from Intel. 1 6 These rewards included "the best pricing, supply
guarantees in times of shortage,.., indemnification from patent liability," and a "slush fund" to help OEMs outbid their competitors.17
All four of these strategies have teeth because large OEMs had no
choice but to purchase Intel's uncontested CPUs and at least some
volume of contested CPUs from Intel because it is the sole chipmaker
capable of supplying all requirements for large OEMs. 1 8 Thus, an
OEM seeking to bargain with Intel could not credibly threaten to
forgo its chips, because rival chipmakers could not fulfill all of an
OEM's requirements." 19
2.

Intel's Deceptive Software Design

Intel's second anticompetitive tactic came through its compiler
software. Compiler software translates the language of computer programmers, called source code, into the language of CPUs, called object code.' 20 The harm alleged is that the chipmaker designed its
12
software to run slower on AMD CPUs than on Intel CPUs. '
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.

115. Id.
116. Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 54.
117. Id.
118. Id. 9150.
119. Id.
120. Id. 57. The complaint discusses libraries in connection with the compiler software.
Libraries are usually bundled together with the compiler software and serve as a reference to
"collections of code for performing certain functions that can be referred to by software programmers rather than rewriting code each time the functions are performed." Id.

121. Intel Complaint, supra note 6,

1 58.
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The FTC here equates "deceptive practices" with competitive
harm. 122 Such practices include Intel's failure to disclose its redesign
and its manifestation that "programs inherently performed better on
Intel CPUs than on competing CPUs."'1 23 These "false or misleading"
representations made the "slower performance of non-Intel CPUs on
Intel-compiled software applications appear[] to be caused by the
non-Intel CPUs rather than Intel software. '12 4 Furthermore, its
software redesign had "no sufficiently justifiable technological
125
benefit."
The reason these practices are supposed to be anticompetitive is
twofold: (1) they "deprived consumers of an informed choice between
Intel chips and rival chips, and between Intel software and rival
software," and (2) they "raised rivals' costs of competing in the relevant CPU markets." 126 As for the latter claim that this practice
"raised rivals' costs," the complaint is silent on how it does so.127
As to the former, the FTC parsed out the effects of these representations on industry benchmarking organizations. These organizations
run programs on different computer systems and assess the relative
performance of these systems.1 28 The benchmark results provide the
measure by which "consumers decide on purchases, OEMs select
components, and CPU producers make pricing and model number
designations.' 1 29 Because several benchmarking organizations used
Intel's compiler software, 130 and because the chipmaker promoted its
product by claiming these results reflected accurate "real world" performance, 3 1 Intel's "material and false or misleading" representations "eroded the credibility and reliability of these benchmarks and
the software compiled by Intel compilers."'1 32 The FTC claims that
Intel "had a duty... to disclose the complete truth, which would have
eliminated most if not all of the harm to competition and
consumers. "133
Intel carried out its final alleged step through independent software
vendors (ISVs). ISVs are companies that create task-specific
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. 1 59.
Id.
Id.
Id. 91
61.
Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 61.
See id. 1 56-71.
Id. 1 62.
Id.
Id. 1 64.
Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 11 65-68.
Id. 1 71.
Id.
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software, such as anti-virus programs, to operate on a Microsoft or
Apple system.13 4 The chipmaker paid ISVs to use its compilers,
which, because of the design discussed above, "favor[ed] Intel's
CPUs."'1

35

The firm also required that ISVs only list Intel's name on

their products, which "created a false impression that the ISV was incompatible with non-Intel CPUs. 1 36 Finally, Intel is said to have prevented ISVs from joint ventures to market and develop products with
other chipmakers "by causing those ISVs to fear that Intel would
1 37
withdraw its support for their products.
3.

Intel's Anticompetitive Conduct in the GPU Market

Intel faces stronger competition in the GPU market, and it has allegedly sought to stunt the growing threat of its competitors, Nvidia
and ATI.138 It has done so in three ways: first, by denying the interoperability of chipsets that integrate the CPU and GPU;139 second, by
designing its software to reduce speed when working with competitors' GPUs;1 40 third, by bundling its own CPUs and GPUs below
cost. 1 41 These practices are supposed to have anticompetitive poten-

tial because Intel's alleged monopoly in the CPU market "dictates"
interoperability between the connections that allow communication
between Intel's CPUs and rival GPUs.142 Intel has "allowed unhindered accessibility to these interfaces and encouraged others to become reliant on that accessibility.'

43

However, now that GPU

makers, OEMs, and consumers have become "dependent" on the Intel interfaces, Intel has allegedly limited accessibility "to enhance or
obtain monopoly power in the relevant markets."' 44
For the first tactic, the FTC details Intel's denial of interoperability
with Nvidia. The two firms worked together for several years to ensure interoperability and Intel licensed Nvidia to manufacture GPUs
to be used with Intel CPUs.145 However, Intel has now "reversed its

previous course ...

, thereby

foreclosing Nvidia's integrated chipsets

134. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 75 (2001) (describing specific ISVs
such as Symantec and its antivirus software and Netscape and its internet browser).

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 73.
Id. $ 74.
Id.
Id. T[ 75-79.
Id. T 81.
86-87.
Intel Complaint, supra note 6,
Id. T$ 88-89.
Id. 1 81.
Id.
Id.
Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 9182-83.
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from connecting to Intel's future CPUs."'1 46 It is also said to have
"misled Nvidia on Intel's 'roadmaps' . . . , causing Nvidia to waste
resources and crucial time researching and designing integrated chipsets when, in fact, Intel allegedly had no intention"'147 of allowing the
chips to work together.
For the second factor, Intel's reduced performance with non-Intel
GPUs, the FTC claims that "Intel has created several interoperability
problems, including reductions of speed and encryption, that have had
the effect of degrading the industry standard interconnection with Intel's CPUs."'1 48 It appears that the FFC alleged that Intel slowed its
own performance in order to sabotage the development of General
Purpose GPU performance. The Analysis to Aid in Public Comment
sheds a bit more light on the idea: "Intel took steps to create technological barriers to preclude non-Intel integrated chipsets from interconnecting with future Intel CPUs."'1 4 9 Thus, in an effort to assure
that high-functioning GPUs do not compete with Intel's CPUs, the
chipmaker allegedly dismissed the opportunity for increased performance and instead took steps to decrease performance in its own connections with its own CPUs.
The third claim is a straight-forward bundling claim. The FTC alleges that Intel combines its CPUs with its GPUs and then prices this
bundle "to deter OEMs from pairing Intel CPUs with non-Intel
GPUs.' 150 This "has resulted in below-cost pricing" whenever "Intel
is likely to recoup . . . any losses that it suffered.' 15' Some OEMs
purchased the bundle and nevertheless discarded Intel's GPU to replace it with an Nvidia GPU, but when Intel learned of this, it increased prices to these OEMs and offered a lower price to OEMs that
52
would use the complete Intel bundle.
Together, these practices allegedly "enhanced [Intel's] monopoly in
the relevant CPU markets. ' 153 They "create[d] a dangerous
54
probability that it will acquire a monopoly in the GPU markets.'
Finally, they have "no legitimate or sufficient business justification,"
146. Id. 84.
147. Intel Analysis, supra note 9, at 48,341.
148. Intel Complaint, supra note 6, $[ 86-87.
149. Intel Analysis, supra note 9, at 48,342.
150. Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 88.
151. Id. As noted earlier, for purposes of the complaint, cost is "average variable cost plus an
appropriate level of contribution towards sunk costs." See supra note 109 and accompanying
text.
152. Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 89.
153. Id. 90.
154. Id. 91.
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and, the FTC concludes, it harms "competition, innovation, and
consumers."1
4.

55

Intel's "Unfair Methods of Competition" in Industry Standards

The final allegation accused of Intel was that the firm manipulated
industry standards in a way to benefit its own products and thwart
others. Specifically, the chipmaker is said to have tampered with the
industry standards controlling elements of Universal Serial Bus (USB)

and High Definition Content Protection (HDCP) ports. 156 It allegedly induced firms to rely on its standard, represented that they would
157
be fairly accessible, and then delayed accessibility to the standards.
The FTC alleges that it did so to "gain a head start... and wrongfully
restrain competition."'1 58 Because it had no offsetting procompetitive
efficiencies, concluded the FTC, it deterred competition and enhanced
Intel's monopoly power with CPUs. 159 This claim, however, is not in
the Analysis to Aid Public Comment, which was released the same
time as the Decision and Consent Order; thus, it was dropped at some
60
point in the proceedings.
C. Intel's Anticompetitive Effects

Intel's conduct allegedly harmed consumers and competition by
way of "higher prices" for CPUs and GPUs. 16 ' But the comparative
adjective "higher" is alone in the Complaint; the FTC does not articulate the measure from which it concludes prices increased. Intel also
apparently committed other anticompetitive acts: it reduced competition to innovate; it inhibited competitors from effectively marketing; it
reduced output of CPUs and GPUs; it raised rivals' costs; it deprived
consumers of their choice of CPUs and GPUs by harming choice at
the OEM level; it reduced incentive to innovate; and, finally, it reduced the quality of industry benchmarking. 162
III.

THE STATED AND IMPLIED RULES

The FTC articulates a broad set of rules to condemn Intel's conduct.
Because Intel settled with a Consent Decree, no more development of
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id. 92.
Intel Complaint, supra note 6, $ 92.
Id.
Id.
See Intel Analysis, supra note 9, at 48,341 to 42.
Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 94(a).
Id. I 94(b)-(h).
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the standard occurred through the Decision and Order, and so the
Complaint is the only source from which to draw out the rule. While
it is unfortunate that the FTC did not apply a clear standard, it is at
least helpful to articulate the conduct that caught its attention; indeed,
that may be all the certainty this case has to offer. The following
analysis attempts to outline the rules the FTC only briefly mentions.
The "course of conduct" theory controls the complaint. The statement of law beginning the complaint makes this clear; 163 so does the
fact that every allegation at the conclusion of the complaint incorporates every paragraph that describes Intel's conduct. 164 The FTC asserts its authority under Section 5 to condemn
any course of conduct that causes actual or incipient harm to competition. Moreover, where a respondent that has monopoly power
engages in a course of conduct tending to cripple rivals or prevent
would-be rivals from constraining its exercise of that power, and
where such conduct cumulatively or individually has anticompetitive effects or has a tendency to lead to such effects, that course of
conduct falls within the scope of Section 5. Respondent may defend
against such charges, however, by proving that any actual or incipient anticompetitive effects resulting from the Respondent's course
of conduct are offset by procompetitive effects, and that engaging in
that course of conduct was reasonably
necessary to achieve those
165
offsetting procompetitive effects.
Three parts emerge from this formulation. First, the FTC can question a course of conduct causing "actual or incipient harm" to competition. This apparently does not depend on market power because the
following additional ground for enforcement applies when a respondent has monopoly power. Second, the agency can question a monopolist's course of conduct when it tends to either (1) cripple rivals or (2)
prevent potential rivals from constraining monopoly power. Under
either of these two elements, the FTC must show the conduct to create either (1) actual anticompetitive effects or (2) a tendency to lead
to such effects. Third, the respondent can defend by showing (1)
procompetitive justifications that offset the anticompetitive effects
and (2) the course of conduct was reasonably necessary.
Additionally, two sets of implied rules can be extrapolated from the
allegations against Intel. The first set applies only to respondents with
monopoly power. 166 One proscription seems to be that a monopolist
may not simultaneously withhold benefits from disloyal buyers and
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. 1 1.
Id. 1 97-105.
Id. 1 1.
Intel Complaint, supra note 6,

5.
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provide benefits to loyal buyers.1 67 Another is that market share or
168
volume discounts may not foreclose some aspect of competition.
Next, product design changes must have a legitimate technical benefit.1 69 Moreover, a product design change that affects the performance of a competitor's product requires disclosure of such "material"
information. 170 Finally, a respondent may not pressure third-party
vendors to advertise compatibility with the respondent's product and
71
not its competitor's product.'
The second set of implied rules applies to conduct that "could allow
[respondent] to acquire a monopoly."'1 72 First, when a firm has a monopoly in one market, it may not deceive producers in a complimentary market regarding interoperability between its monopoly product
and the complimentary product.' 73 Also, a respondent's previous
course of dealing may create a duty to deal and cooperate with its
competitors regarding interoperability t 74 Under the latter circumstances, respondents may not then create barriers to interoperability.175 Finally, in a bundling claim where a respondent prices
below cost, the FTC need not show that it is likely to recoup those
costs.

176

As mentioned previously, the FTC's legal theories in this case are
untidy. The complaint uses ninety-six paragraphs to explain Intel's
conduct, and all ninety-six of them constitute "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair acts or practices.' 77 Additionally, paragraphs
fifty-six through ninety-six (Part B, subsections 2 - 4, supra) count as
"deceptive acts or practices."'1 78 Accordingly, there is no way to guide
analysis using familiar legal elements as guideposts; therefore, the
only definitive answer to determine what triggers FTC intervention is
the fact pattern illustrated above, as the agency sees it. Herein lies the
central criticism of Section 5: No one knows what is illegal until it is
too late. But it need not be so. The following analysis seeks to explore the relative merits and faults with the above set of rules. It also
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. 6.
Id. 9.
Id. $ 8.
Id. 10.
Intel Complaint, supra note 6,
Id. $ 14.
Id. T 18.
Id. 11 20-21.
Id. T 18.
Intel Complaint, supra note 6,
Id. 1 97-105.
Id. 103.

10.

18.
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proposes a set of guideposts that may contain this otherwise amorphous provision.

IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE

FTC's

COURSE OF CONDUCT RULE

The following analysis examines the justifications for FTC intervention on the basis of each of the three elements of the course of conduct rule mentioned above. First is conduct causing "actual or
incipient harm" to competition when a firm does not have market
power. Second is conduct that either cripples rivals or prevents potential rivals from constraining monopoly power. Third is anticompetitive effects. Briefly summarized, the first prong is only justifiable with
respect to incipient conduct that would lead to a per se Sherman Act
violation. The second element is only justifiable in the case of deception or when the conduct falls under no other law and has measurable
anticompetitive effects. Finally, anticompetitive effects should refer
to aggregate harm in the form of market distortions and should not be
limited to end-user harm alone.
A.

Causing Actual or Incipient Harm without Market Power

The FTC asserts the power to condemn "any course of conduct that
causes actual or incipient harm to competition." 179 This statement
breaks into three parts. First is actual harm, second is incipient harm,
and third is the unstated question of market power under both types
of harm. Analysis will first examine the question of market power and
conclude that the FTC will have no ability to find "actual harm" when
a firm does not have market power. However, the "incipient harm"
analysis will show that the Commission may have justifiable power to
enjoin burgeoning conduct that would clearly become a per se Sherman Act violation. This may involve firms without market power, but
it would only apply to them if the conduct, left unchecked, would be
an unlawful use of market power. Additionally, because incipient
conduct is a particularly sensitive area where an incorrect decision
could eliminate socially desirable innovation, the FTC must limit itself
to benchmarks of certainty that have proven track records in Sherman
Act jurisprudence. Finally, the Commission's authority in this element should be limited to examining firms without market power that
seek it through illegitimate means; this must be sharply distinguished
from firms legitimately competing for a monopoly, as the latter is a
highly desirable form of competition.
179. Intel Complaint, supra note 6, T 1.
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With respect to the "actual harm" portion of the rule, unfortunately, nothing in the sentence indicates that the firm must have market power. Indeed, the very next sentence of the stated rule
encompasses the conduct of "a respondent that has monopoly
power. '180 Giving effect to every word in the rule, one reading is that
the FTC asserts the power to stop practices that cause "actual or incipient harm to competition" even when the offending firm does not
have market power. 181
For this reading of the "actual harm" portion of the rule to have any
impact, courts would have to recognize harm to competition in the
absence of market power. They will not. One of the most basic principles of antitrust law and its economic underpinnings is that competitive harm exists only when the defendant has market power.' 82 Thus,
given that all courts and scholars agree that market power and actual
harm to competition are coterminous, 183 part of this reading of the
rule would be unenforceable in the courts.
However, the second prong, "incipient harm,"'1 84 may be a more
viable means of enforcement for the FTC when a firm does not have
market power. The Commission has a fairly robust history of enjoining one type of incipient harm: an invitation to collude. 18 5 These
cases do not allege that the offending firms have market power, and
indeed, one commissioner has argued that such a requirement would
stifle enforcement efforts because a required showing of market
power would act as a shield, giving firms who would form a pricefixing cartel "a free bite" at attempting to collude. 186 It is also important to note that once collusion exists, the cartel itself is the entity with
market power, not necessarily the firms that constitute it. Therefore,
an enforcement effort against invitations to collude would require that
the FTC have the authority to pursue firms that do not have market
power.
In a recent case of this nature, the FTC articulated several sound
arguments in favor of its authority to enjoin invitations to collude:
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 20 (1984);
Alan J. Messe, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 106
(2003).
183. See Messe, supra note 182, at 106.
184. Intel Complaint, supra note 6,
1.
185. See Valassis Comm'cns, Inc., 141 F.T.C. 247, 282-83 (2006).
186. Quality Trailer Prods. Corp., 115 F.T.C. 944, 951-52 (1992) (Comm'r Deborah K. Owen,
concurring statement).
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First, it may be difficult to determine whether a particular solicitation has or has not been accepted. Second, even an unaccepted solicitation may facilitate coordinated interaction by disclosing the
solicitor's intentions or preferences. Third, the antisolicitation docpotentially
trine serves as a useful deterrent against conduct that is 187
harmful and that serves no legitimate business purpose.
In addition to the FTC's asserted rationales, this type of injunction
is consistent with broader competition policy goals embodied in Sherman Act jurisprudence. One such goal, perhaps the most central, is
ensuring that the laws themselves do not bring about the effect they
seek to proscribe; 188 that is, competition law should not foreclose
procompetitive business arrangements.
The invitation-to-collude cases produce no such effect. The purpose
of these cases is to prevent a price-fixing cartel. A price-fixing cartel
is correctly per se unlawful in the first place because it has such a high
likelihood of harm to competition and an equally unlikely potential
for procompetitive justifications. 189 While it is possible that price-fixing in some circumstances may be socially desirable, for example, to
ensure that corporations stay afloat during a severe recession, those
circumstances are sufficiently rare that, on balance, "the law can more
efficiently assume that collusion is always harmful."' 190 It thus
presents no problems to hold it per se unlawful because chilling competition is unlikely. 191 Given that the optimal rule of law is an absolute ban on the practice itself, an injunction on an invitation to do the
practice should compliment the Sherman Act's currently ideal level of
enforcement in this area. Thus, it is wise and within the bounds of
sound competition policy to enjoin invitations to collude.
However, the Commission must be cautious in enjoining invitations
to collude and other "incipient" behavior. As Commissioner Deborah
K. Owen noted, sometimes a legitimate joint venture that is otherwise
procompetitive may involve two competitors discussing price, as was
the case in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc.19 2 Therefore, the FTC should only condemn burgeoning conduct
when it can be certain that such practice, when full blown, would be a
per se Sherman Act violation.
187. Valassis, 141 F.T.C. at 283 (citing 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTI-

1419 (2003)).
188. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004)
(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)).
189. See Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 23, at 125-26.
190. Id. at 126.
191. See Hovenkamp, supra note 14, at 882.
192. Quality Trailer Prods. Corp., 115 F.T.C. 944, 951-52 (1992) (Comm'r Deborah K. Owen,
concurring statement) (citing Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979)).
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This is no longer a categorical inquiry. The Supreme Court issued a
firm decree in CaliforniaDental Ass'n v. FTC that there is no bright
line between per se illegal conduct and that which requires rule of
reason analysis. 193 The current standard under California Dental
states that
[t]he object is to see whether the experience of the market has been
so clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about the
principle tendency of a restriction will follow from a quick (or at
least quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one. And of course
what we see may vary over time, if rule-of-reason
analyses in case
194
after case reach identical conclusions.
Therefore, the FTC must only enjoin conduct with a proven, reliable,
and well-established pattern of competitive harm. This can only come
when rule of reason analyses reach the same conclusion time after
time.
Additionally, Microsoft exposes reasons for courts, and necessarily
the FTC, to hesitate to enjoin unfamiliar conduct. In Microsoft, the
court declined to hold a product tie per se illegal in the operating system market because such a holding "might stunt valuable innovation. ' 195 Per se rules correctly apply when courts have significant
experience with a particular act; the rules allow courts to confidently
conclude that their ban causes "very little loss to society" and that "an
inquiry into its costs in the individual case can be considered unnecessary."'1 96 Because "efficiencies are common in technologically dynamic markets where product development is especially unlikely to
follow an easily foreseen linear pattern," the court found it unjustifiable to conclude that Microsoft's product tie should fall under per se
197
analysis.
While Microsoft's holding is limited to the facts of its case,198 its
reasoning has broad support in the Supreme Court. 199 NCAA v.
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma noted that judicial
200
inexperience counsels against extending the reach of per se rules,
and Trinko cited Matsushita when it noted that mistaken inferences in
the myriad means of legitimate competition are "especially costly" in
193. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FrC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999). See also Polygram Holding, Inc. v.
FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
194. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 781.
195. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
196. Id. at 94 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 33-34 (1984)).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 95.
199. Id. at 94.
200. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 n.21 (1984).
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the field of antirust. 20 1 This reasoning thus should give pause to the
FTC and courts examining the agency's decisions before they enjoin
conduct in its incipiency that does not have a high degree of certain
illegality under well-established case law.
An additional limit must constrain the FTC as it scrutinizes the conduct of firms without market power: it must not enjoin a firm's conduct simply because it seeks market power. This clarification is
critical to fostering healthy competition because there are strong reasons to allow firms to compete for monopoly status. Consider Judge
Posner's summary of Joseph Schumpeter's "gale of creative
destruction:"
[C]ompetition to obtain a monopoly is an important form of competition .... The more protection from competition that the firm that
succeeds in obtaining a monopoly will enjoy, the more competition
there will be to become that monopolist; and provided that the only
feasible or permitted means of obtaining the monopoly20 2are socially
productive, this competition may be wholly desirable.
In the debate over how best to foster innovation, this is a distillation
of its principles that most economists agree with 20 3 and it is the view
that the Supreme Court endorses. 20 4 Thus, the Commission should
refrain from intervening when firms legitimately compete to become
monopolists.
In sum, the first portion of this prong of the rule, which seems to
claim the power to condemn conduct that causes "actual harm" to
competition even without market power, cannot be enforced because
no court will find competitive harm in the absence of market power.
Under the second portion of the rule, the Commission is within justifiable bounds to intervene when it sees incipient conduct that, if fully
carried-out, would be a per se unlawful exercise of market power.
The determination of whether the incipient conduct would be per se
unlawful requires that it not enjoin unfamiliar practices. Put differently, the FTC must limit itself to offenses that have consistently
shown harm to competition. Finally, while the Commission will need
the ability to question firms without market power in order to properly enjoin invitations to collude and similar practices, it should not
question firms that are fully competing to obtain a monopoly.
201. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004).
202. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 10.11, at 331-32 (7th ed. 2007).
203. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Inno-

vation, 74

ANTITRUST

L.J. 575, 577-89 (2007).

204. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407.
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Conduct Against Rivals Having Anticompetitive Effects

Under the agency's second prong, it can proscribe a monopolist's
course of conduct when it tends to either (1) cripple rivals or (2) prevent potential rivals from constraining monopoly power. 20 5 A further
requirement under either element is actual anticompetitive effects or
20 6
a tendency to lead to such effects.
1. Crippling Rivals
With respect to crippling rivals, the FTC would be on an interesting
line apart from the Sherman Act were it not for the sub-element of
anticompetitive effects or their tendency. A maxim of the Sherman
Act is its concern is "with the protection of competition, not competitors. ' 20 7 Thus, the language of condemning the "crippling of rivals"
raises immediate skepticism that the FTC would have to overcome by
showing that Section 5 should interfere when one firm harms another.
The competitive harm requirement nevertheless refocuses the rule
into the arena of competition law.
The question then is the proper role for the FTC with respect to
conduct that cripples rivals and harms competition. On one hand, the
Sherman Act covers several areas of conduct in which one firm harms
another, such as predatory pricing schemes. On the other hand, common law covers still more types of conduct in which one firm harms
another, such as misappropriation of trade secrets. The FTC already
has the power to enforce the provisions of the Sherman Act, 20 8 and so
the relevant questions are (1) whether the Commission should condemn conduct that falls into common law, and (2) if not, whether any
conduct remains untouched by the Sherman Act and common law
which the FTC should condemn.
Common law theories that businesses frequently use in this context
include interference with contractual relations, misappropriation of
trade secrets, 209 and fraud. 210 The first theory, interference with contractual relations, should not be a tool of FTC enforcement. The elements of an interference claim vary widely from state to state, but its
basis in all states comes from the English case Lumley v. Gye. 21 1
205. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
207. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
208. FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986).
209. See 86 C.J.S. Torts §§ 41-67 (2011).
210. See 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 1 (2011).
211. Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B.). See also Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies:A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49
U. CHI. L. REv. 61, 63 (1982).

580

DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:555

There, an opera singer had a contract with Lumley, but opted to sing
for Gye because he had offered a higher fee.2 1 2 The Queen's Bench
announced a rule of liability for maliciously "interrupting a personal
service contract, regardless of the means used. 2 1 3 Prominent scholars, including Dan B. Dobbs,2 14 Richard A. Epstein,2 15 and Harvey S.
Perlman, 2 16 have objected to the tort for various reasons, most notably
for its tendency to deter efficient breaches 217 and its hindrance of the
21 8
competitive markets.
Competition policy accepts that its rules are a set of incentives and
disincentives and seeks to encourage firms to reduce prices for consumers. 219 By contrast, the interference tort is based on the nebulous
terms of fairness and justice, with no concern for the incentives its rule
creates. 220 As a result, plaintiffs who lose an antitrust claim can often
use the interference tort in state court and still prevail with substantial
damages.2 2 1 As a result of these conflicting incentives and liabilities,
the potential defendant, which has been encouraged to offer its lowest
prices at all times by competition law, is at the same time hamstringed
from offering its best deal when it knows that its rival has already
contracted at a less advantageous price. Therefore, the FTC should
not enforce the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations because the tort itself is questionable under various rationales,
and because it is contrary to the central goals of competition policy.
The next area, misappropriation of trade secrets, is equally unjustifiable for FTC enforcement. A trade secret claim generally has three
elements: (1) the information must be secret; (2) the plaintiff must
have taken reasonable precautions to protect the secret; and (3) the
defendant must have taken the information wrongfully. 222 Scholars
do not agree as to whether this rule sounds in tort, property, or contract, but Mark Lemley makes a compelling case for trade secret law
212. Perlman, supra note 211, at 63.
213. Id. at 63-64 (citing Lumley, 118 Eng. Rep. at 752).
214. Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L. REV.

335, 344 (1980).
215. Richard A. Epstein, Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 22-23 (1987).
216. Perlman, supra note 211, at 97-98.
217. Id. at 89-90.
218. Epstein, supra note 215, at 22-23.
219. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224, 226
(1993).
220. See Dobbs, supra note 214, at 363-65.
221. See Marina Lao, Tortious Interference and the Federal Antitrust Law of Vertical Re-

straints, 83 IowA L. REV. 35, 61 (1997).
222. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311, 317 (2008); Unif. Trade Secrets Act §§ 1-3, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
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to be classified as an intellectual property (IP) issue. 223 Under his
framework, trade secret law is one more incentive in the IP regime to
encourage innovation: when a firm can rely on legal control and exclusivity, it can charge supracompetitive prices, and this prospect encourages innovation. 224 As for its place within the IP regime, trade secret
law functions best when it protects information that is impossible to
obtain through reverse engineering, such as the recipe for Coca-Cola,
while patent law functions best to protect information that would be
225
discernable through reverse engineering.
Therefore, trade secret law has powerful justifications; however, the
FTC's potential role in this area is difficult to justify. If the information were truly secret, then the Commission would have little reason
or ability to become aware of a misappropriation except through a tip
from the aggrieved firm. That company has the private right to seek
injunctive relief and punitive damages. 2 26 With this regime in place,
there is little incentive for the complainant to defer to the FTC because a higher reward would come from private enforcement. It is
furthermore unlike traditional competition law claims because the injury is discrete and limited, whereas a typical antitrust claim has market-wide effects that hurt not only the aggrieved firm but also
consumers across the market. Thus, from a competition policy perspective, the FTC's involvement here is unjustifiable.
The final frequently used common law doctrine for harm to a business is fraud. Broadly, fraud is "an intentional perversion of the truth
for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with
some valuable thing belonging to him or her or to surrender a legal
right. '22 7 An instrumentalist justification for prohibiting fraud is that
it is socially wasteful: the liar "makes a positive investment in manufacturing and disseminating misinformation. '2 28 With respect to disclosure of information, inasmuch as the fraud regime generally
allocates the burden of discerning information in the least socially
229
costly manner, it is an efficient rule.
The FTC already correctly deters fraud through the "deceptive acts
or practices" portion of the FTC Act. 230 In one statement of its rule,
223. See generally Lemley, supra note 222.
224. Id. at 329-30.
225. Id. at 339. See also Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent
Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 417-18 (2010).
226. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 2, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
227. 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 1 (2011).
228. POSNER, supra note 202, § 4.7, at 111.
229. Id. at 112-13.
230. 14 U.S.C. 45(a)(1) (2006).
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the Commission proscribes "first, . . . a representation, omission, or

practice that, second, is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably
under the circumstances, and third,... is material.

'231

This focuses on

a firm's deception of consumers, most typically in advertising. 232 This
kind of intervention is justifiable under a consumer protection or competition policy standpoint for several reasons. First, in a competitive
market, the misrepresentations of one rival may divert such a small
number of sales from each competitor that insufficient incentive exists
to correct the rival's fraud. 233 Second, when a monopolist lies, even
less incentive exits for its fringe competitors to correct it because, by
definition, there is no close substitute for the monopolist's product;
therefore, if another firm is sufficiently distant for the monopolist to
have a true monopoly, the lies will have even less effect on it than in
the case of a competitive market.234 Third, when a misrepresentation
applies to all sellers and it is beneficial to them (for example, if one
cigarette company states that cigarettes are healthy) there is a disincentive for any rival to correct the lie.2 35 Thus, the FTC's intervention
when a firm misrepresents its products may be necessary to overcome
the disincentive for private enforcement, and is therefore a justifiable
mechanism of competition policy.
The final avenue to explore is whether some conduct against rival
firms exists that is neither a common law violation nor a Sherman Act
violation, but still has sufficient impact on competition to warrant
FTC intervention. This appears to be the route the FTC took in NData with respect to a patent hold-up.
In N-Data, the firm that had acquired an industry standard promised the industry a flat $1000 license fee, but N-Data purchased that
firm's patent and subsequently charged much more than $1000.236
The FTC noted that contract remedies would have been inadequate
because it affected an industry-wide standard, which in turn affected
many third parties who lacked privity to sue. 237 The Commission
pointed out that the patentee's conduct might not be a Sherman Act
violation 238 and noted that this was a standalone Section 5 proceeding.239 The case has met criticism on the grounds that the FTC did not
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 165 (1984) (Opinion of the Comm'n).
See id. at 51-52 (Comm'r Patricia P. Bailey, concurring and dissenting statement).
POSNER, supra note 202, § 4.7, at 112.
Id.
Id. at 113.
N-Data Analysis, supra note 45, at 5847-48.
Id. at 5849.
Id. at 5848.
Id. at 5849 n.9.
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adequately show consumer harm, that it turned a contract dispute into
an antitrust concern, and that it added uncertainty to the standardsetting process. 240 The proper role of antitrust enforcers in the standard-setting process is beyond the scope of this article, but it must be
emphasized that this is an area where firms have reason to be wary of
FFC intervention.
More importantly, N-Data serves as a vehicle to define workable
contours that might contain Section 5: if an act against a rival does not
provide the rival with a remedy under any other law, and it is not a
Sherman Act violation, then the FTC should use its fact-finding ability
to investigate whether the conduct causes harm to competition. If
there is clear anticompetitive harm, then the Commission should enjoin the conduct. These limiting principles would have addressed the
noted concerns with the N-Data case. Under the above test, the Commission would have had to show (1) harm to rivals (2) no other remedies were available to the rivals, (3) the Sherman Act does not apply,
and (3) harm to competition. Each of these, fully measured, would
have prevented the FTC from making the purported mistakes claimed
above.
In sum, the FTC is currently correct in avoiding intervention when
there is an interference with contract claim and when there is a misappropriation of trade secrets claim. However, the FTC needs to intervene, as it currently does, in deception cases. Also, the FTC's
standalone Section 5 power can be a useful tool to encompass other
conduct that brings harm to competition but that falls within no other
area of law. Competitive harm analysis will follow shortly, but the
next step is the second element of the FFC's course of conduct theory:
preventing would-be rivals from constraining monopoly power.
2. Preventing Would-be Rivals from Constraining Monopoly Power
The FTC asserts the power to prohibit a course of conduct "tending
to ...prevent would-be rivals from constraining its exercise of [mo-

nopoly] power. ' 241 This element's meaning is murky in the Intel
Complaint. However, other mentions of it in a few different places in
the Intel Docket fill in the contours of its meaning. First is Commissioner Rosch's Concurrence and Dissent, where he writes that the
combination of harm to rivals and high barriers to entry harms competition by constraining rival firms' ability to challenge monopoly
240. Joshua D. Wright & Aubrey N. Stuempfle, Innovation for the 21st Century: Harnessing
the Power of Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law: Patent Holdup, Antitrust, and Innovation:
Harness or Noose?, 61 ALA. L. REV. 559, 566-67 (2010).
241. Intel Complaint, supra note 6, 1.

584

DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:555

power. 242 Second is the Analysis to Aid Public Comment, which cites
the absence of substitutes to Intel's x86 CPUs as a lack of constraint to
monopoly power.2 43 Thus, one reading of the definition of a "con-

straint" to monopoly power is simply competition. If this reading is
accurate, then the import of this rule is to say that the FTC can enjoin
a monopolist's course of conduct if it prevents its potential rivals from
competing with it.
This rule must embrace a critical limitation, but once it is thus limited, it becomes superfluous and so the FTC need not use this prong.
The critical limitation is that innovation and competitive pricing cannot be seen as preventing future rivals from constraining monopoly
power. The threat of a rival's entry to a monopolist's market is of
paramount importance to ensuring that a monopolist imparts social
benefits because a monopolist innovates and keeps its prices from going too high when it perceives the threat of entry by potential rivals. 244
However, a monopolist can innovate and price in such a way as to
beat a potential rival to the market and enjoy a first-mover advantage.2 45 Interpreted broadly, this could be viewed as "preventing its
rivals from competing" with it, but this is a socially desirable outcome.
If the monopolist reacts to competitive threats by successfully innovating and pricing the product at a level sufficiently low to keep a new
entrant out, it necessarily means that the most efficient producer-the
monopolist-is the one delivering the product.2 46 A better formulation of the rule then would be to enjoin a course of conduct that unlawfully prevents a future rival from constraining monopoly power.
The word "unlawful" would refer to acts that are illegal under existing
law or that can be shown to produce clear anticompetitive effects; and
as noted earlier, the constraint to monopoly power is competition.
Boiled down, the rule thus limited would mean that the FTC prohibits acts that are already illegal and anticompetitive. This formulation is consistent with Sherman Act jurisprudence and all of the
justifiable enforcement mechanisms mentioned above. Because these
means are already available to the FTC, this portion of the rule is
redundant and unnecessary. Therefore, the Commission need not enforce it.
242. Intel Corp., FTC Docket No. 9341 (Dec. 16, 2009) (Concurring and Dissenting Statement
of Comm'r J. Thomas Rosch), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelstatement.pdf.
243. Intel Analysis, supra note 9, at 48,340.
244. D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 37, 66 (2007).
245. See Baker, supra note 203, at 581-82.
246. Id.
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Competitive Harm

Each one of the proposed elements of this rule is subject to the final
requirement of competitive harm. The question of the appropriate
measure of competitive harm generally has two poles. Either the appropriate measure is end-user welfare alone or it is aggregate welfare.
The theory of the aggregate welfare measure is that any market distortion, including those that occur "upstream" from end-users, may be
sufficient to constitute harm to competition.
A microcosm of this debate appears in Fishman v. Estate of
Wirtz. 247 Judge Easterbrook contends that it is strictly end-user
harm.2 48 Judge Cudahy contends that aggregate welfare should control so that any market distortion could constitute harm to competition.249 Judge Easterbrook's adherence to the end-user measure
stems from the Chicago School's roots in price theory in defining anti25 1
trust policy. 250 Its appeal is its apparent simplicity.
However, the aggregate welfare measure is better justified. First, it
is most consistent with antitrust law's continuously upheld purpose to
promote competition. 252 Second, limiting antitrust law's coverage to
downstream consumers alone may reduce net social utility. 253 For example, from a static point of view, a consumer may suffer from the
increased prices a monopolist charges, but from a dynamic point of
view, that wealth transfer may result in greater innovation and access
to improved products in the future. 254 Third, even when there is a socalled wealth transfer from consumers to sellers, that wealth is not
separated by some "impermeable barrier," but it "can percolate
through to individual consumers" by means of capital markets and
255
employee stock ownership.
Thus, the aggregate standard embraces monopolies as potentially
beneficial market actors. This analysis therefore accepts them as a
necessary evil. If the lawful monopolist is an accepted actor in U.S.
competition policy, then the law must respond by correcting the nega247. 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986).
248. Id. at 564 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
249. Hon. Richard D. Cudahy & Alan Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 MINN. L. REV. 59,
85-86 (2010) (discussing Fishman in detail, for which Judge Cudahy authored the majority
opinion).
250. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925,928
(1979).
251. Id.
252. See Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 249, at 89.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 100, 102-03.
255. Id.
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tive consequences of its pricing. The solution must ensure that consumers (1) internalize the benefits they confer upon the monopolist
and others and (2) accurately signal their demand.
In cases where monopoly pricing is the competitive harm, the F-TC's
standalone Section 5 power is better than the current Sherman and
Clayton Act regime of private rights of class action and treble damages. 256 The most powerful reason is that the latter regime would create a double bind. If the aggregate welfare standard encourages
legitimate monopoly innovation, 257 and then penalizes the monopolist
with treble damages for properly responding to this incentive, it would
be counterproductive.
On the other hand, the FTC's actions under Section 5 do not allow
follow-on treble damages3 5 8 This would solve the objection to Sherman and Clayton Act enforcement noted above, because it would ensure that "[t]he successful competitor, having been urged to compete,
259 Secondly, the FTC is an
...[is] not... turned upon when he wins."
expert agency with flexible fact-finding tools:
When the Commission was established in 1914, it was not intended
to duplicate the functions of existing agencies, but rather to bring to
bear on the problems of antitrust and unfair competition the "specialized knowledge and expert judgment, continuity of experience
and political independence, flexible procedures and efficient fact- [hopefully] characteristic of the administrative
finding methods
'260
process."
Given this unique ability, the FTC would be better suited than private
plaintiffs or the Justice Department because it could fully investigate
the effects of a monopolist's pricing without the procedural barriers of
a Sherman Act lawsuit. 261 Furthermore, the Commission has the
262
power to shape unique remedies tailored to the particular case.
This can include various forms of monetary relief, such as disgorgement for improperly obtained monopoly gains, restitution, and asset
freezes. 263 These remedies could solve both concerns noted above;
256. See Bell Al. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007).
257. See supra notes 252-55 and accompanying text.
258. J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Welcoming Remarks, The FTC's Section 5 Hearings: New Standards for Unilateral Conduct? (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/rosch/090325abaspring.pdf; accord Hovenkamp, supra note 14, at 877.
259. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
260. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 635 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (quoting Philip
Elman, Comment, Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC's Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78
HARV. L. REV.385, 387 (1964)) (addition by Justice Fortas).
261. See Sokol, supra note 20, at 1065-66.
262. See Hovenkamp, supra note 14, at 878.
263. FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 36-37 (D.D.C. 1999).
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they could restore the benefit consumers conferred on the monopolist
and they could subsequently restore their ability to signal their true
demand.
D.

The Ideal Rule

Having analyzed in detail each element of the FTC's course of conduct rule, this Part briefly recaps how the Commission should limit the
theory. First, in finding "actual harm," the FTC must show that the
offending firm had market power. Second, as it seeks out "incipient
harm," it does not necessarily need to show market power, but it does
need to show that the conduct, if full-blown, would be a per se Sherman Act violation. A good example of this is the FTC's invitation-tocollude cases. Furthermore, in the incipiency analysis, the Commission must avoid challenging conduct simply because it could lead to
market power. The lawful pursuit of monopoly power is one of the
prime goals of U.S. competition policy. For conduct that harms rivals,
the FTC should avoid enforcing claims like interference with contract
and misappropriation of trade secrets. However, it should intervene
when the harm includes deception with market-wide effects. When
the conduct is not covered by the Sherman Act or any other law, the
FTC should intervene only when it shows (1) no other law applies, (2)
harm to rivals, and (3) harm to competition, which is defined below.
With respect to conduct that would prevent future rivals from constraining monopoly power, the Commission must limit itself to conduct that is already unlawful. If the monopolist prevents rivals from
competing with it through innovation and competitive pricing, it
should not face sanctions. Given this limitation, however, the FTC
would simply have the power enjoin illegal and anticompetitive conduct, which is an unnecessary redundancy for which other enforcement mechanisms exist, and therefore the Commission need not use
this prong of the rule.
Additionally, harm to competition should not mean strictly consumer harm; it should mean harm to aggregate welfare such that market distortions suffice to show competitive harm. Finally, when the
FTC must intervene through this framework, it must do so only under
its standalone Section 5 authority because it must not allow private,
follow-on treble damages. Also, the remedy must be carefully tailored to correct the market distortion. Throughout this analysis, however, the respondent has the opportunity to proffer procompetitive
justifications for its conduct. Should those outweigh the competitive
harms, the Commission must withdraw.
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Thus, the Commission's power to combat certain anticompetitive
conduct under its standalone Section 5 power can be properly limited
and it can serve a socially beneficial purpose. Content and meaning
can exist in its course of conduct theory. These limitations can provide certainty to businesses and correct potential market distortions
that prevent the optimal flow of scarce resources.
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite the criticisms levied against the FTC and its amorphous
power under Section 5, the Commission can correct significant market
distortions through limited intervention. Its flexible fact-finding and
remedy-fixing abilities, along with its preclusion of follow-on treble
damages make it the ideal enforcer for certain types of conduct. Some
of this conduct may have indeed existed in Intel's case, but, unfortunately, the materials in the Intel Docket do not provide the detailed
legal analysis that would make future FTC intervention predictable.
At the very least, the complaint against Intel gives firms factual notice
as to the types of conduct that may catch the Commission's attention.
Additionally, the Complaint serves as a helpful vehicle from which
to analyze the proper role of the FTC in shaping the incentives and
disincentives of competition policy in the United States. The "course
of conduct" theory that seems to drive the Commission's complaint
against Intel has some powerful justifications. Some incipient conduct
deserves an immediate sanction, such as inviting others to collude, and
the FTC's flexibility in enjoining firms without market power here is
necessary to accomplish this goal. Some deception affects more than
just the wronged firm; it can have market-wide affects. This was indeed one of the Commission's allegations against Intel in the deceptive software design portion of the Complaint.
Still more conduct falls under neither the Sherman Act nor any
other common law, but has potential anticompetitive effect, such as
that involved in the N-Data case. This conduct cannot go unchecked,
and the FTC's flexible fact-finding ability may be well suited to investigating such conduct's implications on competition.
Finally, the appropriate measure of anticompetitive effect for the
FTC is the aggregate welfare standard. The standard would consider
any market distortion to be sufficiently damaging to warrant investigation, but it would not be so quick to conclude that monopoly price
alone is sufficiently harmful, because such pricing can, in the long run,
be socially beneficial. As it engages this analysis, the Commission
would recognize the value of competition to become a monopolist, it
would recognize a monopolist's central role in spurring and perpetuat-
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ing innovation, and it would ensure that "[tihe successful competitor,
having been urged to compete,... [is] not ... turned upon when he

wins. "264
A carefully calibrated set of limitations, however, must surround
the FTC's broad grant of power under Section 5. The Commission
must recognize that competitive harm can only exist when a firm has
market power. It must also only examine incipient conduct that has
tried-and-true anticompetitive effects under the Sherman Act. The
FTC should not enforce common law norms that already have in place
the proper incentives and remedies for purposes of competition law.
The Commission must also avoid confusing a monopolist's innovation
and competitive pricing with conduct that is anticompetitive, because
these actions are socially beneficial.
While this analysis embraces the monopolist as a socially desirable
means of encouraging competition and innovation, it cannot go unchecked. Monopoly pricing is the reward that attracts such innovation, but it is also the culprit in some undesirable market distortions.
In the presence of such distortions, the FTC's standalone Section 5
enforcement is better than Sherman and Clayton Act enforcement. It
can tailor unique remedies necessary for the situation and it can avoid
the double bind problem that the Sherman Act creates when it encourages the pursuit of monopoly on one hand but imposes treble
damages for monopoly pricing on the other.
The Commission, established to address problems of antitrust and
unfair competition with "specialized knowledge and expert judgment,
continuity of experience and political independence, flexible procedures and efficient fact-finding methods," 265 can be part of a well-adjusted enforcement regime. To bring about this ideal, it must be clear,
as Chairman Leibowitz has said, "about the rules of the road going
forward. '26 6 This paper has followed the current policy goal of U.S.
competition law-efficiency-to outline the potential limits of those
rules.

264. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
265. Elman, supra note 260.
266. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Press Release, FTC Settles Charges of
Anticompetitive Conduct Against Intel (Aug, 4, 2010) available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/
08/intel.shtm.

